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TO BELIEVE IN BLACK STARS OR RED DRAGONS?:
COMPARING THE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
CLIMATES OF GHANA AND CHINA
ABSTRACT
When thinking of overseas business expansion, most think of China. This is
for good reason: China commands a lion’s share of foreign direct investment
money. It would shock readers to know that there are destinations that are far
more suitable for overseas investment than China. It would shock readers even
more to know that one of these destinations is in sub-Saharan Africa.
Ghana—the Black Star country—has quietly put together a legal regime
that is extremely attractive for foreign direct investment. When comparing
Ghana’s foreign investment policies to China’s, Ghana’s policies are indisputably more favorable to foreign investors. Ghana offers more incentives, imposes fewer restrictions, and the administrative side is considerably
more transparent. This Note will show that the prospective foreign direct
investor should look to Ghana as a more hospitable destination for proposed foreign enterprises.
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INTRODUCTION
China provides the world’s blueprint of how an impoverished country can
fast-track itself into becoming a global economic power. Over the last thirty
years, the eastern country has become a hotbed for overseas expansion for
multinational enterprises. By contrast, the coastal African country of Ghana is
seemingly overlooked as a destination for foreign business expansion.1
Both countries have a similar history and timeline. The two countries
emerged from their most formative revolutionary periods just seven years
apart, immediately adopted policies of isolationism and economic nationalism, and later liberalized in order to attract foreign investment to strengthen
their respective economies.2 Despite the similarities in their beginnings, China emerged as a success story, while Ghana ultimately declined.3 Are the results of these two developing countries a function of the attractiveness of their
respective foreign direct investment policies?
This Note will show that the foreign direct investment policies of Ghana
are significantly more attractive than those of China. It will highlight Ghana’s Investment Promotion Center Act of 1994 and juxtapose it against
comparable Chinese policy. The comparison will show that Ghana offers
more incentives, clarity, and transparency, as well as fewer restrictions in
tailoring its foreign direct investment policy.
Part I will give the reader an understanding of what foreign direct investment is. After defining the term, this Part will answer the questions of
why business entities look to expand abroad, why host countries look to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), what are the dangers to host countries
that they seek to avoid with policymaking, what policies attract and deter
FDI, and why has FDI not flowed to Africa in significant quantities. Part II
will explore the backgrounds of China and Ghana as they relate to investment policy and their history and effectiveness in attracting FDI. Part III
will compare Ghana’s Investment Promotion Centre Act to the FDI policies
fashioned by China. This Part will proceed by first comparing restrictions,
then incentives, and finally the level of ambiguity in regulation of FDI.
With each of these comparisons, the Note will detail the most attractive
types of policy developed with respect to these three areas, explain the rationale behind such policy, and show what the policies enacted by Ghana
and China mean to internationally expanding investors. By the conclusion
of the Note, the learned reader-investor should be convinced that Ghana is a
more viable investment destination than China.
1

See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.A–C.
3
See infra Part II.C.
2
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I. WHAT IS FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI)?
A. Definition of FDI
There is no generally accepted common definition of foreign direct investment. The World Trade Organization defines FDI as “when an investor
based in one country (the home country) acquires an asset in another country (the host country) with the intent to manage that asset.”4 The definition
used by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development requires
the intent to “acquire a lasting interest” in a foreign enterprise.5 Still, other
definitions place more significance on the aspect of control of a company in
a foreign country by way of ownership of a “significant amount” of stock or
asset ownership.6 The United States Department of Commerce establishes a
bright line minimum for such a significant amount at ten percent ownership
of a company operating abroad.7
For the purposes of this Note, FDI will be defined as the possession of a
controlling interest of a business operating abroad. This encompasses wholly owned foreign businesses, joint ventures with partners in the foreign
country, and, most commonly, mergers and acquisitions of foreign entities.8
FDI does not encompass a straight portfolio investment because the investor
acquires no relevant degree of control over a company.9 Common examples
of portfolio investment would be the purchase of foreign corporate bonds
and smaller amounts of foreign stock.10 The line between portfolio investment and FDI is crossed when the investor moves past profiting from the
business of a foreign enterprise and on to actually driving the profit of the
foreign-operating business.11
B. Impact of FDI on Developing Host Countries
FDI, by itself, has the potential to drive an economy like an overcharged
engine. The economies of Singapore and Hong Kong are composed largely
4

REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH & MARTIN B. TITTLE, INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK,
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: OVERVIEW AND CURRENT STATUS 3
(2002), available at http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=35117232.
5
DAMBISA MOYO, DEAD AID: WHY AID IS NOT WORKING AND HOW THERE IS A
BETTER WAY FOR AFRICA 98 (2009).
6
Richard J. Hunter, Jr., Legal Considerations in Foreign Direct Investment, 28 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 851, 853 (2003).
7
Id.
8
Id. at 855 (noting that cross-border mergers have been a dominant form of FDI ever
since 1999, where cross-border mergers and acquisitions increased by thirty-five percent).
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
See id.

2013]

THE BLACK STAR AND RED DRAGON

721

of FDI.12 FDI inflows can directly benefit the economy of a host country.
For one, FDI brings the surplus of wealth of advanced countries into developing ones. Some scholars even argue that FDI is a much more effective
means of achieving economic development than more generally used methods, such as foreign aid and International Monetary Fund loans.13 Economic development is achieved through FDI by the “increased capital flows
into countries with limited domestic financial sources....”14 The increased
amount of capital also brings more jobs into the domestic economy, places
more money in circulation (allowing for the accrual and formation of capital by local parties), and leads to regional development.15 Additionally,
with a significant amount of FDI being focused toward either exporting
products manufactured in the host country, or producing products for the
consumption of the host country (that would otherwise be imported), FDI
inflows reduce trade deficits in the host country by either increasing exports or reducing imports.16
Aside from the direct impact on the economy, FDI proponents also
highlight the potential for “spillover” effects on the host country.17 The
most significant and accepted of these spillovers involves the diffusion of
competitive information and technology to lesser-developed countries.18
Naturally, when a multinational corporation (MNC) or other business entity enters into a foreign market, it will bring its proprietary technology and
processes that it uses to maintain a competitive advantage.19 This includes
management, organizational, and marketing expertise. Domestic partners
(and employees) can learn from the foreign enterprise’s capabilities, technology, management expertise, and industry insights.20
This diffusion process starts with the introduction of new hardware or
processes—and the skills necessary to operate the hardware or conduct those
12

FDI is thirty-one percent of Hong Kong’s GDP and seventeen percent of Singapore’s
GDP. See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2011, at 189,
U.N. Sales No. E.11.II.D.2 (2011), available at http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCT
AD-WIR2011-Full-en.pdf (listing each country’s GDP); World Economic Outlook Database,
INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/weodata/index
.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (providing a database listing each country’s GDP).
13
See generally MOYO, supra note 5.
14
Hunter, supra note 6, at 851.
15
See MOYO, supra note 5, at 101–02; Hunter, supra note 6, at 862.
16
Hunter, supra note 6, at 868.
17
See, e.g., id. at 862.
18
See id. at 855.
19
MAGNUS BLOMSTROM ET AL., FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: FIRM AND HOST
COUNTRY STRATEGIES 103 (2000).
20
DAVID CONKLIN & DON LECRAW, FOREIGN OWNERSHIP RESTRICTIONS AND
LIBERALIZATION REFORMS 70–71 (1997).
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processes—to the host country. Potential adopters in the host country come
into contact with the innovation, information about it is diffused, uncertainty about it is lessened, and, ultimately, the probability of adoption is increased.21 The adoption process can consist of duplicating the innovation
and hiring workers already trained by the foreign entity.22 Additionally, the
adoption of technology forces the multinational enterprise (MNE) to create
more innovations to compete with duplicated processes and technology and
also puts internal pressure on host-country domestic enterprises to compete
with the new innovations.23
FDI can increase the training of a host country’s workforce in the same
manner that it can bring innovation to a host country.24 Because education is
typically lacking in developing countries, the training brought by MNEs is
crucial.25 MNCs provide much more worker training than do host country
domestic businesses.26 Management expertise, in particular, is improved in
the FDI host country.27 A training diffusion occurs when MNEs train managers, who later move to other firms and dissipate their acquired management expertise.28 Although it can be hard to lure away managers from
MNEs given the typically higher salary, this diffusion has been realized in
places like South America, where managers found in domestic firms often
start their careers in MNCs.29
It is also worth noting that, in addition to helping diffuse innovation
and training, MNEs also assist in the advancement of domestic parties
within the MNEs’ supply chains.30 When an MNE decides to source locally from the host country, it needs inputs that will meet its quality standards
so that it can produce a high-quality output. If the suppliers do not have
adequate technology, training, or processes, then they cannot meet the
MNE’s need. MNEs eliminate this problem by helping suppliers set up
production, providing technical information, and providing training.31 The
assisted suppliers can grow from small, local businesses with limited capabilities to larger, nationally or globally competitive firms.
21

BLOMSTROM ET AL., supra note 19, at 105.
Id. at 101.
23
Id. at 103.
24
Id. at 116.
25
Id. at 117.
26
Id. at 117–18 (using Hong Kong as an example).
27
MOYO, supra note 5, at 101.
28
BLOMSTROM ET AL., supra note 19, at 117.
29
Id.
30
Smita Kulkarni et al., McDonald’s Ongoing Marketing Challenge: Social Perception
in India, 1 ONLINE J. OF INT’L. CASE ANALYSIS, Jan. 31, 2009, at 1, 9, http://ojica.fiu.edu
/index.php/ojica_journal/article/viewFile/19/18.
31
BLOMSTROM ET AL., supra note 19, at 113.
22
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McDonald’s is one of the most widely known practitioners of supplier
development.32 When it entered India, it faced substantial supply chain inadequacies.33 It trained its supplier of lettuce, Trikaya Agriculture, in advanced
irrigation and food storage.34 Trikaya—once a small, local agribusiness—was
able to supply produce to not only all of the India-based McDonald’s locations, but also to begin supplying exports from Austria to the Pacific.35
Alabama’s courtship of major foreign automotive players showcased
each of the above benefits of attracting FDI. The once destitute state attracted production from four major foreign car companies from 1993 to
2002—Mercedes-Benz, Toyota, Honda, and Hyundai.36 The most notable
cases were Mercedes-Benz and Hyundai.37 The state of Alabama offered
incentives packages valued at around $253 billion in each case.38
While these expenditures did amount to a large investment, the return
has more than justified the cost. The Mercedes site created 1500 jobs,39
while the Hyundai site created 2000.40 The Montgomery, Alabama Hyundai
site alone creates $99 million in earnings for its employees.41
The indirect benefits were just as significant. It was estimated that another 6000 indirect jobs would be created (with annual earnings of $180
million) by Hyundai suppliers and “spin-off” enterprises such as maintenance, services, construction, and retail.42 The same effect was forecasted
for the Mercedes-Benz venture.43 Once these large firms established themselves in Alabama, support firms followed to meet their production demands.44 For example, Johnson Controls, Inc., a Milwaukee-based manufacturer, set up operations in Alabama to produce car seats for the Tuscaloosa,
32

Kulkarni et al., supra note 30, at 4.
Id. at 12.
34
Id. at 13.
35
Id.
36
Foreign Car-Makers Put Once-Poor US State on the Road to Better Times, THE
IRISH TIMES, Apr. 19, 2002, at 63 [hereinafter Road to Better Times].
37
STEPHEN D. COHEN, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT 167 (2007).
38
Id.
39
James Bennet, Mercedes Selects Alabama Site, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1993, at D1,
available at LEXIS-NEXIS COMPANY NEWS.
40
Road to Better Times, supra note 36.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
See Bennet, supra note 39.
44
Mercedes-Benz Project: First-Year in Alabama—Progress Report, PR NEWSWIRE,
Sept. 28, 1994, available at LEXIS-NEXIS FINANCIAL NEWS [hereinafter Mercedes-Benz
Project] (“A number of Mercedes-Benz systems suppliers have decided to locate in
Alabama to meet our ‘just in time’ and ‘just in sequence’ delivery requirements.”).
33
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Alabama Mercedes-Benz facility.45 Likewise, Rockwell Automotive, based
in Michigan, established operations in Alabama to supply the Mercedes-Benz
plant with sunroofs.46
The indirect benefits of these ventures reached outside of Alabama, as
well. Perhaps the most notable example was IBM’s multimillion-dollar
contract to design the technology blueprint for the Tuscaloosa plant.47 Albert Kahn Associates, Inc., of Detroit, handled the architectural and engineering design of the facility,48 Fluor Daniel Inc. of Irvine, California was
awarded the construction management contract,49 and Ohio’s Packard
Electric was awarded the contract to design electrical distribution for the
plant.50 Even the United States Treasury was touched by the FDI installations, as half of the Mercedes-Benz vehicles produced in Tuscaloosa were
intended for export from the United States.51
By the installation of the Hyundai plant in 2002, the automotive industry in Alabama had appeared out of nowhere and become a staple of the
state’s economy.52 At this point, Alabama had 220 automotive manufacturing companies employing 300,000 workers.53 By 2006 an estimated
600,000 vehicles would be coming from a state that had produced none
just a decade earlier.54 Hyundai’s venture was estimated to generate a positive economic impact of as much as $280 million per year, allowing the
state to recuperate its investment by 2011.55 Additionally, growth prospects
are high because DaimlerChrysler—twelve percent owner of Hyundai—has
invested another $600 million to double production at Montgomery, raising
employment to 4000.56
45

Johnson Controls to Supply Headliners ‘Just-in-Time’ for Mercedes-Benz All Activity
Vehicle, PR NEWSWIRE, Aug. 5, 1994, available at LEXIS-NEXIS FINANCIAL NEWS.
46
Rockwell to Produce Sunroof Assemblies for New Mercedes-Benz All-Activity
Vehicle, PR NEWSWIRE, Aug. 8, 1994, available at LEXIS-NEXIS FINANCIAL NEWS.
47
I.B.M. Gets Mercedes-Benz Contract for Alabama Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1994,
at p. 39, available at LEXIS-NEXIS COMPANY NEWS; IBM Wins Mercedes-Benz Consulting Contract, BUSINESS WIRE, Feb. 18, 1994, available at LEXIS-NEXIS.
48
Mercedes-Benz Awards Construction Management and Architectural/Engineering
Design Contracts for New Tuscaloosa Plant, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 11, 1994, available at
LEXIS-NEXIS FINANCIAL NEWS.
49
Id.
50
Packard Electric Is Awarded Mercedes-Benz Project, PR NEWSWIRE, Aug. 5, 1994,
available at LEXIS-NEXIS FINANCIAL NEWS.
51
Mercedes-Benz Project, supra note 44.
52
See Road to Better Times, supra note 36.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
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Benefits were bestowed on both sides of these FDI ventures. The companies were able to decrease their production and marketing costs as well
as move closer to their customers.57 Alabama received an injection of jobs,
a relocation of established American firms, and the creation of a booming
automotive industry. Alabama represents a strong case for the positive
side of FDI.
C. Policy and the FDI Climate
The “FDI climate” has been understood by various authors to encompass the economic conditions, infrastructure, social conditions (for example, labor policy conditions), political climate (such as risks associated
with hostile or unstable regimes), and FDI policy.58 Excluding FDI policy
and political risk, a country can have an attractive environment for FDI by
having cheap labor, yields that are greater than what can be achieved
elsewhere, and access to natural resources.59
With respect to building an attractive FDI policy regime, the requirements can be more extensive. In general, attractive FDI policy imposes few
restrictions, provides for national treatment—or better than national treatment—of foreign enterprises, is backed by sound commercial law, has
transparent customs regulations and a fair tax code, and includes an agency that facilitates, rather than hinders, investment.60 The legal rights of
foreign enterprises must be “adequately balanced and protected” and must
“guaranty fairness in adjudication.”61
Incentives that make the FDI climate attractive can be divided into
three categories: fiscal incentives, financial incentives, and other incentives. Fiscal incentives are those that reduce tax expenses.62 These include
reductions in the corporate tax rate, tax holidays (deferrals on taxes for a
number of years), accelerated depreciation allowances, tax credits for profit
that is reinvested in the host country, and exemptions from export or import duties and value-added taxes.63
57

Robert Schoenberger, Long-term Relationships Put Alabama 1st, Official Says, THE
CLARION LEDGER, Oct. 20, 2001, at 1C (noting that by producing vehicles in Alabama,
these companies would avoid a twenty-five percent import tariff on vehicles); see Bennet,
supra note 39.
58
See LARS H. THUNELL, POLITICAL RISKS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: INVESTMENT
BEHAVIOR OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 5–6 (1977).
59
Hunter, supra note 6, at 870–71.
60
Id. at 871–72.
61
Id. at 872.
62
COHEN, supra note 37, at 165.
63
Id.
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Financial incentives are typically direct grants of money, such as subsidies for land, labor, training, construction, or low-interest loans.64 A prevalent example of financial incentive packages would be the two $253 million packages that Alabama gave to Mercedez-Benz and Hyundai to allure
the companies into locating manufacturing plants there in 1993 and 2002,
respectively.65 While this type of incentive is effective, it is generally unavailable to the developing country, which does not have large sums of surplus cash to finance such packages. Consequentially, fiscal incentives are
easier for developed countries to implement.
Other incentives do not deal directly with finances, but make entry into
the host country easier. These include infrastructure development (such as
laying communication lines for a proposed production site) and closing the
market to foreign competitors.66 Having an agency that facilitates foreign
investment can also be put into this category. Singapore and Ireland feature “one-stop shop” agencies that make the administrative and legal matters of establishing a foreign enterprise relatively painless.67 Those two
countries are behind only Hong Kong in annual FDI inflow per capita.68
D. Why Does FDI Not Flow to Sub-Saharan Africa?
Put in perspective, at times, China’s annual FDI inflows have been
more than five times that of the entire continent of Africa.69 FDI flows into
countries in sub-Saharan Africa seem to be hindered, mostly not by the
unattractiveness of their FDI policies, but more by the social, economic,
and political factors that make up the FDI climate.70 MNEs are naturally
encouraged to invest where they can make a higher return and where labor
costs are low.71 Since the African markets are not as crowded with MNEs,
the potential for return on investment is higher.72 MNEs in Africa stand to
make returns sixty-six percent higher than those in Southeast Asia, Europe, and the Pacific, and fifty percent higher than those in South America.73 Additionally, the depressed economies of African countries have left
their labor costs as low as anywhere else in the world.74
64

Id. at 165–66.
Id. at 167.
66
Id. at 166.
67
Id. at 159–60.
68
Id. at 160.
69
MOYO, supra note 5, at 99.
70
Id. at 100.
71
Hunter, supra note 6, at 870–71.
72
MOYO, supra note 5, at 102.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 99.
65

2013]

THE BLACK STAR AND RED DRAGON

727

Despite these positives, MNEs still stay away from Africa. Major deterrents include infrastructure and administrative difficulties. In many African
countries, the infrastructure is poor, which makes producing and transporting
goods much more expensive.75 Additionally, corruption, bureaucracy, and
highly circumscribed regulatory systems scare potential investors away from
the continent.76 Africa does hold some of the world’s most complex administrative FDI regimes, such as Cameroon, where the average FDI enterprise
takes 426 days and fifteen procedures to obtain all proper licensing.77
These obstacles to FDI are substantial in Africa, but are they found in
Ghana? If these types of economic and political hurdles are not found in
Ghana, then the only issue remaining in analyzing the comparative attractiveness of the FDI climates of Ghana and China will be the FDI policy
that each country has enacted. The next Part will compare the backgrounds
of Ghana and China and show that the above hurdles are not a factor in
comparing the two countries, so that this Note may progress on to evaluating the differences in each country’s FDI policy.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Restricted Beginnings
The communist People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, while
the Republic of Ghana was the first African country to achieve colonial
independence eight years later.78 Following each country’s revolutionary
period, both countries adopted major isolationist policies.79 China, under
Mao Zedong, was virtually closed to the outside world and its investors.80
Ghana similarly sought to limit foreign enterprise ownership and control
from the onset of its 1957 independence.81 Both were motivated by similar
sentiments of independence and self-sufficiency.82 Under the Great Leap
Forward campaign, China attempted to achieve self-sufficiency by powering its economy completely by communes. The Ghanaians believed that in
75

Id. at 100.
Id.
77
Id. (compared to South Korea, where this only takes seventeen days and ten procedures on average).
78
Felix Wemheue, Dealing with Responsibility for the Great Leap Famine in the People’s
Republic of China, 201 THE CHINA Q. 176, 179 (Mar 16, 2010); CONKLIN & LECRAW, supra
note 20, at 53.
79
See CONKLIN & LECRAW, supra note 20.
80
MAURICE MEISNER, MAO ZEDONG 89–91 (2007).
81
CONKLIN & LECRAW, supra note 20, at 53.
82
Id.
76
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order to attain political independence, Ghana needed to achieve economic independence.83
B. Collapse
The idea of self-sufficiency did not aid the development of either
country’s economy, as both had fallen into disrepair by the late 1970s.84
The shortcomings of the Great Leap Forward led to one of history’s largest incidents of famine—causing the estimated deaths of 15–40 million people in two years.85 Ghana had fallen into perpetual economic crisis, marked
by currency devaluation, high interest rates, rapid inflation, and massive
capital flight.86
C. FDI Liberalization
After the 1976 death of Mao Zedong, China began a period known as
Gaige Kaifang (literally “opening up and reform”), which included the liberalization of trade and FDI policy.87 China enacted its first statute governing foreign investment in 1979.88 For the next thirty years, China maintained largely open policies to attract high quantities of foreign investment
into the country by way of preferential treatment.89 By 1994, China was offering reduced tax rates for MNEs located in special geographic zones and
tax holidays for manufacturing enterprises that were scheduled to operate
for more than ten years.90 China saw immediate success with FDI.91 The
first wave of FDI came in the 1980s, mostly in the form of joint ventures; a
second wave came in the 1990s as wholly owned foreign enterprises; and
now, China is experiencing a third wave, in the form of mergers and acquisitions.92 By 2000, China’s annual FDI inflow was $41 billion;93 this figure
grew to $80 billion by 2006.94
83

Id.
Id.
85
Wemheue, supra note 78, at 176–77.
86
CONKLIN & LECRAW, supra note 20, at 53.
87
Patrice C. McMahon & Yue Zou, Thirty Years of Reform and Opening Up: Teaching
International Relations in China, 44 POL. SCI. & POL. 115, 115 (2011).
88
John Zhengdong Huang, China on the Horizon: Exploring Current Legal Issues:
An Introduction to Foreign Investment Laws in the People’s Republic of China, 28 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 471, 472 (1995) [hereinafter Huang, China on the Horizon].
89
12th Five-Year Plan Is Off to a Good Start, CHINA LAW & PRACTICE (May 2011).
90
Huang, China on the Horizon, supra note 88, at 483.
91
Id. at 471.
92
Hui Huang, China’s New Regulation on Foreign M&A: Green Light or Red Flag?,
30 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 802, 802 (2007) [hereinafter Huang, China’s New Regulation].
84
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After amassing $622.4 billion from FDI in the thirty years following
1978, China was able to “afford [being] more selective” with FDI.95 The
Chinese developed fears that foreigners were taking over too many domestic industries.96 In 2006, foreign investors controlled the top five businesses
in all industrial sectors that were open to foreigners.97 That year, China’s
National Development and Reform Commission announced a shift in its
foreign investment policy that would focus more on the quality than the
quantity of incoming FDI.98 The result was the elimination of tax breaks,
the restriction of many industrial sectors, and increased restriction and scrutiny placed upon foreign mergers and acquisitions.99 Despite the change in
policy, China still amassed nearly $100 billion of FDI inflow in 2010.100
Ghana did not have the same success with attracting FDI inflows.
Ghana began relaxing its FDI restrictions in 1985.101 The prime motivator
was the International Monetary Fund and its Structural Adjustment Program, which advocated liberalized ownership and control practices.102
Ghana realized that if it were too restrictive, then capital would go to other
low-wage countries.103 Ghana declared the first wave of its “open-door”
policies for foreign investors starting in 1985.104 While Ghana has become
West Africa’s largest FDI recipient,105 last year it only logged $2.5 billion
in FDI inflows, compared to China’s $106 billion.106
D. Socioeconomic Comparison
Posed again: does Ghana have the same social and economic obstacles
that have deterred FDI flows to the rest of Africa?107 The answer is no;
93

Hunter, supra note 6, at 852.
MOYO, supra note 5, at 99.
95
Huang, China’s New Regulation, supra note 92, at 808.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Steven M. Dickinson & Daniel P. Harris, Dickinson and Harris on Changes to Foreign
Investment in China, 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 1197 (Lexis 2008).
99
Id.
100
12th Five-Year Plan Is Off to a Good Start, supra note 89.
101
CONKLIN & LECRAW, supra note 20, at 54.
102
See id.
103
Id.
104
See Ken Laryea, Recent Investment Legislation in Ghana, 39 INT’L. & COMP. L. Q.
197, 197 (1990); see also Ghana Investment Act (P.N.D.C. Law No. 116/1985) (Ghana).
105
U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2011, supra note
12, at 41.
106
Id. at 187, 189.
107
See CONKLIN & LECRAW, supra note 20, at 17–21.
94

730

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:717

Ghana is much more developed, socially and economically, than the rest
of sub-Saharan Africa.108 In fact, Ghana’s development in these areas is
only slightly behind China’s.109 In the socioeconomic context as it relates
to FDI, MNEs are attracted by adequate infrastructure, a suitably educated
workforce, and cheap labor costs.110 Ghana is comparable to China in each
of these respects.
In terms of infrastructure, China is more developed, but not by a large
margin. The World Bank rates China’s infrastructure a 3.54 out of 5 (27th in
the World), and Ghana’s a 2.52 out of 5 (71st in the World).111 Similarly,
the World Economic Forum rates China’s infrastructure a 4.4 out of 7 (50th
in the world), and Ghana’s a 2.9 out of 7 (106th in the world).112 The difference between infrastructures seems to have a minimal effect on those doing
business in each country. When given a list of fifteen common problems of
doing business in underdeveloped countries, 12.5% of those doing business
in Ghana listed inadequate infrastructure as a top five problem—compared
to 8% for those doing business in China.113
The Ghanaian workforce has also proved to be just as capable as the
Chinese workforce. The World Economic Forum rates Ghana’s education
and training as 3.3 out of 7 (108th in the world), while rating China’s as
4.2 out of 7 (60th in the world).114 Interestingly enough, inadequacy of
education is a bigger problem in China than in Ghana: 7.4% of those doing
business in China rank inadequate education as a top five problem, whereas
nearly half that figure lists that problem in Ghana.115 Labor is also considerably cheaper in Ghana, where a manufacturer can compensate workers with
as little as $1.65 a day,116 while the average Chinese worker will make $1.36
in just an hour.117
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Because the infrastructure and workforce of Ghana and China are
comparably developed, and the cost of labor is cheaper in Ghana, the last
issue to analyze in determining which country has the more inviting FDI
climate is the attractiveness of the countries’ FDI policies themselves. In
the next Part, the Note will make this comparison.
III. COMPARISON OF FDI POLICY
Ghana’s FDI policy is more attractive than China’s for three reasons: it
features fewer restrictions, offers more incentives, and has an administrative process that is considerably more transparent and efficient.
A. Restrictions
1. Ownership Restrictions
Ownership restrictions limit the industries in which foreigners can
conduct FDI. Some restrictions will prohibit foreign enterprises entirely
from dealing in a certain sector; others will require that a domestic party
jointly own a foreign enterprise to a specified degree.118 Ownership restrictions can be the host country’s most effective means in protecting itself from the danger of losing control over its own economy if it becomes
largely dependent on FDI.119
Naturally, foreign-invested entities (FIEs) conduct business for the
primary economic benefit of those outside of the host country’s borders,
who have little attachment to the host country.120 The interests of FIEs and
the host countries conflict in many sets of circumstances resulting in the
flight of FIEs to other destinations. One issue is the regulation of wages
and labor conditions. Host countries must fear the divestment of FIEs if the
country decides to impose higher regulation on labor and wages.121 Dependence on FDI also means dependence on the MNC’s home country.
FIEs will leave the host country when the local conditions worsen and the
country is in a time of need.122 Japanese MNEs had been heavy investors in
the Asia-Pacific region until the Japanese stock exchange crashed in 1991,
causing large-scale FDI pull-outs.123 FIEs are also loyal to the interests of
118
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their home country.124 Canadian-owned Inco had to reduce jobs due to a
low demand for its product, nickel.125 It was urged by the Canadian government to reduce jobs in Indonesia in order to preserve Canadian jobs, and
it ultimately took such action.126 Requiring some degree of domestic ownership is a way to ensure that a significant portion of the FIE’s control is allotted to a party whose interests align with those of the host country.127
China operates by categorizing all industries as encouraged, prohibited, or restricted, and then mandating different levels of ownership, accordingly.128 Investments in “encouraged” areas are simpler and face no ownership restrictions.129 “Prohibited” areas do not allow foreign investment.130
“Restricted” areas can be harder to classify as they require extra approval
and a degree of domestic ownership.131 Restricted sectors do not foreclose
on foreign investment per se, but proposed investments in this category are
sparingly approved, as the delay during the process discourages applications.132 “The practice in Beijing has been to simply fail to respond to requests for approval.”133
The major problem in this system is that the categories often change. Categories are laid out in the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment
in Industries (Catalogue).134 Since the Catalogue was introduced in 1995, it
has been amended three times, most recently in 2007.135 For example, investment in real estate was specifically encouraged in 2004, but prohibited
just three years later.136 This constant flip-flopping is a manifestation of the
volatility of China’s underlying FDI policy aims. For example, China’s policy had previously supported export-oriented business and allowed related
industries to be “encouraged.”137 Now, China discourages investment in
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industries in which China has already developed a proficiency including
export-oriented businesses.138
Ghana, by comparison, has far fewer ownership restrictions. The country only has compulsory domestic partnership requirements in the fishing
and mining industries.139 Even more, the only sectors reserved solely for
wholly-owned domestic enterprises are taxis, gambling (excluding soccer), kiosk or market sales, and hair salons.140 Ghana likely restricts investments in mining and fishing because natural resources such as minerals and land are a part of any nation’s wealth and heritage.141 Bans on
foreign kiosk sales, taxis, and hair salons reflect the tendency of countries
to discourage foreign investment in areas where foreigners will not bring
new technology, processes, or add value past what the domestic industry
has already achieved.142
2. Currency Exchange Restrictions
Economic considerations motivate countries to limit the outflow of
their currency. When outflows of a country’s currency increase, the supply
of the currency in the international sphere is then increased, which puts
downward pressure on the value of the currency. In the case of FIEs, when
such a venture removes its earnings from the host country and exchanges
the host-country currency for another, the supply of the currency is increased and the value is decreased.
Countries will attempt to limit FDI-related currency outflows at a
number of stages. China restricts the ability to be able to have a foreign
exchange account.143 China created the State Administration of Foreign
Exchange (SAFE) to implement its exchange policy.144 SAFE may outright deny the right of an FIE to maintain a foreign exchange account.145
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Additionally, SAFE restricts FIEs that operate in the current account market (imports and exports) to retaining a maximum of fifty percent of their
export earnings in a foreign currency.146 Non-export/import companies are
processed on an opaque case-by-case basis.147
China also takes things a step further by limiting the amount of foreign
loans that an FIE can use to fund its venture. Medium and long-term debt
is capped at the difference between an FIE’s total investment and registered capital.148 This measure is not an explicit currency exchange restriction,
but it operates with a similar effect. With debt financing being a prevalent
means of capitalization, it is likely to be a part of any business venture.
Foreign loans mean that a portion of the earnings must be repaid to foreign
entities in foreign currency. Domestic loans mean that the same return
must be paid to a domestic lender in the domestic currency. These proceeds are thereby kept in the country.
Ghana has a much simpler process that features no exchange regime or
restrictions. The country guarantees the “unconditioned [currency] exchange” for dividends, net profits, loan payments, and remittances and proceeds for the sale of assets or interests in the enterprise.149 These explicit
havens of currency exchange encompass any type of investment that an
FIE might try to make, and protect any type of return that would be produced in the process.150
3. Capital Requirements
A capital requirement is a minimum amount of funding that a proposed
venture must have before it can begin operations. This ensures that a venture
is adequately capitalized and financially stable. Imposed upon FIEs, it also
has the effect of deterring ventures that have more limited funding.
In China, the capital requirement minimum varies by sector and industry
with the minimum being RMB30,000—about $47,000.151 In the service sector, some notable industries that have capital requirements are accounting,152 advertising,153 construction,154 educational institutions,155 financial
146
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services,156 retail/wholesale,157 freight and transporting,158 hospitals,159 and
law firms.160 In the manufacturing sector, the Chinese have restricted such
notable industries as automotives,161 food,162 and publishing.163 One would
be hard-pressed to find any FDI opportunity in China that would avoid a
minimum capital requirement. In an extreme case, China requires investment-type companies (that operate by taking over existing Chinese companies) to have $30 million in registered capital.164
Ghana has capital requirements for all FDI ventures, but they are lower
and much simpler. Joint ventures with domestic partners are subject to a
$10,000 requirement, whereas wholly owned foreign enterprises are subject to a $50,000 requirement.165 In the most extreme case, trading companies—those that deal only in buying and selling of goods (but not the production)—are subject to a $300,000 minimum.166
4. Restrictions Comparison Summary
Compared to China, Ghana has made its FDI restrictions minimally applied, straightforward, and less intrusive. From the outset, China either explicitly or indirectly bans foreign participation in many industries. Also, in
China, an area that is unrestricted to foreigners in one year may become completely prohibited four years later. Ghana only bans foreign participation in
four specific types of businesses,167 and only requires a domestic partner for
mining and fishing ventures.168 Ghana also has lower, less deterring capital
requirements for a foreign start-up enterprise. Although Ghana still features these restrictions, they are very clear and do not reach the astronomical levels seen in China’s FDI regime. After the enterprise has been established, Ghana also places less of a burden on the FIE by allowing for freer
currency exchange. The Chinese regime has established an opaque SAFE
156
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administration that mandates how much currency FIEs can exchange on a
case-by-case basis with virtually no guidelines for its determination. Ghana,
on the other hand, provides for the unconditioned currency exchange of all
types of profit, remuneration, proceeds, or payments that an FIE could have.
It is clear that Ghana’s FDI climate is significantly less restrictive than
China’s. As compared to an investor acting within the Chinese FDI climate, the Ghana-minded investor will be able to establish an enterprise
remarkably quicker and with near-guaranteed certainty. The costs of doing
so will be less and the enterprise will be less encumbered in its continued
operation. The Ghanaian FIE will not have to worry about changing policies that jeopardize the standing of its foreign ownership.
B. Incentives
1. Tax and Duty Incentives
In general, tax competition can be the pivotal factor when the other factors in competing host countries are roughly equal.169 Tax advantages can
translate to large yields in savings from operations abroad. A manufacturing
firm operating in a lower-income nation will gain a three percent rise in
production for every one percent that a tax policy reduces the cost of capital.170 Common types of FDI tax incentives include reductions in corporate
tax rates, tax holidays (deferrals of taxes for a number of years), accelerated
depreciation allowances, tax credits for profit that is reinvested in the host
country, and exemptions from export duty or value-added taxes.171
The tax incentives that China used to ascend to FDI prominence have
been largely repealed.172 Prior to the change, China reduced income tax to as
low as fifteen percent for foreigners who invested in special economic zones,
coastal cities, or key economic and technological development sectors.173
Additionally, manufacturing operations scheduled to operate for more than
ten years were exempted from taxation during their first two profit-making
years.174 FIEs were even exempt from value-added taxes if they were operating in a “priority industry.”175 Tax breaks for foreign enterprises were virtually eliminated in 2007,176 along with value-added tax exemptions in 2008.177
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China also scaled back the amount of import duty incentives that it had
previously offered. Until 1996, China had given tariff exemptions and preferences for equipment and raw materials imported by newly approved foreign
enterprises, as well as equipment imported for major construction projects.178
Now, China reserves these types of incentives only for FIEs that operate in
high technology.179
Ghana has not been so picky in giving tax and import duty incentives.
Ghana does not give FIEs special tax incentives that are not available to
domestic enterprises; rather it gives FIEs national treatment by applying
the same tax code that governs Ghanaian businesses.180 FIEs are eligible to
receive the same import duties for capital goods that are given to domestic
Ghanaian entities, while also being able to apply for special duty exemptions that would not be available to locals.181
2. Other Incentives
Ghana’s FDI legislation features a unique provision that allows for
discretion and flexibility in attracting FIEs. Under the Ghana Investment
Promotion Centre (GIPC) Act, the administration may, “for the purpose of
promoting identified strategic or major investments ... negotiate specific
incentive packages in addition to the incentive provided under [the GIPC
Act].”182 This discretionary power could allow Ghana to grant incentive
packages similar to those where Alabama offered $253 million incentive
packages to get a Mercedes-Benz plant in 1993 and a Hyundai plant in
2002.183 In the Hyundai package, Alabama went as far as to put forward
$77 million to train production workers along with offering $158 million
in infrastructure improvements and tax abatements, $34 million for the site
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purchase, and $10 million in advertising to state employees.184 It is worth
noting that the GIPC Act gives the Ghanaian administration the latitude to
afford additional incentives.185
Ghana also facilitates the movement of an FIE’s workers. The GIPC Act
guarantees a simple visa system for FIEs.186 Enterprises with $10,000–
$100,000 in invested capital are entitled to one immigration visa; enterprises
with $100,000–$500,000 are entitled to two visas; and enterprises with
greater than $500,000 are entitled to four visas.187 FIEs that need additional
visas may petition for them.188
3. Incentives Summary and Conclusion
At an earlier point in time, China might have offered a much more enticing package for FDI hopefuls, but now it is evident that Ghana has put
out a sweeter pot. China has become a heavy destination for FDI, and thus
does not need to go to extremes to offer attractive incentives. It has reached
a point where it can be more selective with investors. Now, if China does
offer any incentive, then it is offered only to a high priority investor, such as
one who imports articles for scientific and educational use.189
Ghana has not reached this point of FDI prosperity, and thus has not
become as selective. It offers its incentives to all FIEs, regardless of sector
or high-end dealings, and is even willing to work with proposed ventures
on a case-by-case basis for additional incentives. Ghana even offers a wider base of import duty exemptions to FIEs than it does to its own domestic
base. Additionally, the Ghanaian incentive scheme has not changed at all
in recent years, whereas the Chinese scheme has constantly constricted
since 2007. In addition to being less restrictive, the Ghanaian FDI climate
is also more highly incentivized.
C. Administration of FDI Policy
Aside from incentives and restrictions, how administrations implement
their FDI policy can have a large effect on the viability of establishing a
foreign-invested enterprise within a country’s borders. A simpler startup
184
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process required by the host country can allow ventures to be founded
quicker and cheaper, whereas more complicated systems stick prospective
FIEs with more costs, delays, and uncertainty. The transparency and consistency of a host country’s policies can reduce the risk for foreign ventures.
Finally, a guaranteed impartial dispute resolution process can also reduce
some of the risk that the foreign enterprise will face by investing abroad.
1. Start-Up Process
In general, regulatory hassles in the application process can significantly
deter foreign investors, as they create much unpredictability, can triple administrative costs, and can typically be avoided by investing in an alternative destination.190 Regulatory hassles might include having multiple approval organizations, excessive processing fees, slow approval processes, or
seemingly randomly rejection. By contrast, having a more centralized, faster, and more transparent process can make a destination riper for FDI.
China’s startup process is more akin to the former situation. The approval process goes through two major bodies: the National Development
and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Foreign Commerce
(MOFCOM).191 All proposals must be submitted to the NDRC for approval,
which includes compliance with Chinese laws, national security implications, and economic development effects.192 If approved, investors must then
apply to MOFCOM for approval to legally establish a company.193 Then the
investors must apply for a business license from the State Administration
of Industry and Commerce (SAIC).194 After this, the investor needs to register with China’s tax and foreign exchange agencies.195 If the enterprise is a
Greenfield operation—a start-up company—it must gain approval from the
Environmental Protection Ministry and the Ministry of Land Resources.196
However, many FDI ventures are through mergers with, or acquisitions of,
existing domestic companies.197 Prospective FDI ventures that seek to start
in this manner are subject to an additional level of scrutiny by MOFCOM.198
Mergers and acquisitions will not be allowed if they involve a “key industry,” “famous trademark,” or could harm China’s “economic security.”199
190
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Additionally, any merger or acquisition involving more than $200,000 is
subject to automatic antitrust review.200 Under this rule, in 2009, MOFCOM
rejected a $2.4 billion bid by Coca-Cola to buy the Huiyuan Juice Group,
China’s household name beverage company, which controlled forty-two
percent of China’s juice market share.201 MOFCOM feared that the acquisition would harm the competitiveness of the industry.202 In this same fashion, a bid for China’s largest machine manufacturer was also rejected.203
The difficulty in entering China through a merger or acquisition is that the
criteria for rejection are ill-defined. The trend seems to be that the acquisition of larger names or more dominant players in the Chinese market will
not be tolerated. Some even go as far as to accuse China of using these rejections to retaliate against Western rejections of some major international
bids by Chinese companies.204 The simplest way to summarize the Chinese
standard on foreign mergers and acquisitions might be that “foreigners are
permitted to purchase non-majority interests in strong, successful Chinese
companies, but only if there is some added benefit, such as transfer of technology, advanced management or access to foreign markets.”205
Ghana employs a much simpler startup system. It is essentially a “onestop shop.”206 The process is simple: register with the Ghana Investment
Promotion Centre (GIPC), and when the documents are “in order” certification will be issued within three business days, and any additional licensing
issues will be handled by the GIPC.207 This first major advantage of this
policy is that it is an extremely quick system, as an FDI hopeful needs to
wait only five business days for the application to be processed. The second
advantage is that any additional approval or steps that need to be taken will
be handled by the GIPC. This can be extremely helpful if a type of venture
200
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would require additional steps of approval under domestic law (some examples being obtaining certain business licenses or operating permits). Unlike
the Chinese system, the FIE does not to need to worry about being encumbered by the intricacies of the Ghanaian domestic regulation. As long as the
proposed FIE meets the GIPC requirements, the remaining details will be
taken care of by the Ghanaian authority.
Investors normally react very well to the “one-stop” format. Singapore
and Ireland have created investment promotion agencies that act as one-stop
shops to help foreign enterprises handle the commercial, administrative, and
legal details, and now these countries are behind only Hong Kong in FDI
inflows per capita.208
2. Transparency
The most attractive policy on paper does not, in itself, create the most
attractive FDI climate. A country may have a poor FDI climate because of
either the policy itself, or because there is substantial uncertainty or instability in the policy.209 Opaqueness and volatility can have a damaging effect on the attractiveness of FDI policy.
In China, the regulatory system is “opaque” and administration is
largely unaccountable.210 Chinese regulators have substantial discretion to
impose unexplained restrictions and the administrative bodies are not required to publish (with substantial analysis) decisions on foreign investment approvals or denials.211 U.S. investors have reported to the U.S. Department of Commerce that regulators at times rely on unpublished internal
guidelines in making decisions.212
Additionally, Chinese regulations can change seemingly overnight and
without notice. When China’s National Development Reform Commission
revised the Catalogue in 2007, no English language version was released and
the English website was “strangely silent” on the revision.213 RWE Thames
Water withdrew from a water treatment project in 2004 when the Chinese
government changed the rules on rate of return for investments in its class.214
The volatility of Chinese policy also raises somewhat of an expropriation
issue. Investments in real estate, construction, luxury hotels, and office buildings were encouraged by 2004 policy but restricted in 2007.215 In an even
more extreme case, foreign investment in residential housing was encouraged
208
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in 2004, but absolutely prohibited in 2007.216 In the first case, the change
would have left investors with the option of divesting entirely or selling the
required ownership interest to a domestic party. In the second case, the foreign investor would be forced to divest entirely.
The system is fundamentally more transparent and stable in Ghana. For
one, the policies do not change. The relevant policies have been laid out in
the same act and have stood, without amendment, since 1994.217 There is no
opaque approval process because, unlike China, which bases its approvals
around abstract criteria like economic security and key industry analysis, the
Ghanaian requirements are all concrete. In Ghana, the FDI venture only
needs to supply the required capital and application.218 Additionally, all of the
requirements, incentives, and processes are spelled out in the GIPC Act.219
3. Dispute Resolution
The process for dispute resolution can ensure that an FIE’s financial interests are protected. Ideally, an FIE would want a process that is impartial,
transparent, independent, and relatively expedient.
In China, the court system is not independent from other branches of the
government, so the other branches may—and often do—intervene at any
time or disregard judgments from courts.220 Chinese officials urge firms towards Alternative Dispute Resolution,221 but this might not lead to the fairest result in China. The Chinese party has never lost an FDI-related arbitration dispute in China.222 A foreign investor in China, thus, has no guarantee
of obtaining a fair judgment in China. To the contrary, it seems like an unjust result is more likely.
In Ghana, the GIPC Act assigns FIEs specific dispute resolution
rights.223 Foreign investors have the right to arbitration under the rules of the
UN Commission of International Trade Law, any bilateral or multilateral
agreement between Ghana and the investor’s home country, and any other
process agreed to by the investor and the Ghanaian government.224 If there
is a disagreement between the investor and the government regarding the
method of dispute settlement, then the investor’s choice will prevail.225 Standing in stark contrast to China, Ghana gives investors notions of fairness by
216
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supplying procedural justice protocol recognized by the international community. Additionally, the FIE has the upper hand in forum selection and
method disputes. This system operates to give the FIE a more attainable
promise of impartialness and equity.
4. Administration Summary and Conclusion
The administration of Ghanaian FDI policy is much more transparent,
stable, convenient, and fair. At the onset of the venture, the Ghanaian-minded
enterprise will be approved much quicker than its Chinese-minded counterpart, which will be encumbered by multiple levels of scrutiny and a more
opaque approval process. The Ghanaian FIE will feel a higher level of security knowing that the policy that governs it will remain unchanged, but
the Chinese FIE will have to assume the risk of sudden changes that might
have effects as severe as the effective expropriation of the enterprise’s interest. Finally, should any disputes arise, the Ghanaian FIE has a better
chance at fair, independent, and impartial adjudication.
CONCLUSION
China is the world’s hot button investment locale, but the FDI climate in
Ghana merits attention from internationally-vested business entities. Unlike
the increasingly restrictive Chinese climate, the Ghanaian climate allows for
a wider range of incentives, while hindering FIEs with fewer restrictions.
Ghana’s FDI policy is also implemented in a clearer, more stable manner.
Where China’s policy seems to be underscored by the deterrence of FDI that
does not deal in high technology or a critical developing industry, the Ghanaian policy is not so selective. With socioeconomic values that are either just
as favorable or more favorable to foreign investment as those found in China,
Ghana stands as an equally viable destination for FDI. Investors should strongly consider operating in Ghana, as the Black Star country’s FDI climate is immensely more favorable than the one found in the land of the Red Dragon.
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